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AFTER UNITED STATES V. WHITE, WILL THE FOURTH CIRCUIT EVER
PERMIT FORCIBLE MEDICATION TO RESTORE COMPETENCY FOR
DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH NONVIOLENT CRIMES?*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are imprisoned awaiting trial in North Carolina on
several counts of identity theft, conspiracy, and credit card fraud.'
You are taken to several hearings before a judge, but none of it
makes any sense. You have no idea how long you have been in prison
or how long you will have to stay. The prison officials suddenly come
into your cell and inform you that you are being transferred to a
facility in Texas for competency restoration treatment. You have no
idea what "competency restoration" means, but you follow the guards
out to the bus. There is no point in resisting; one way or another, the
guards always win those battles.
You board a plane headed for Texas. When you arrive,
numerous doctors and counselors, whom you have never met, start
asking you questions about the most private details of your life. You
refuse to answer. They keep asking you to take medication. You
refuse all medical intervention. The government decides it is going to
force you to take the medication, despite the fact that you have never
been violent to any of the staff, you are not charged with any violent
crimes, and the medical staff agrees you present no imminent risk to
yourself or others. Your lawyer and a three judge panel on the Fourth
Circuit are all that stands in the way of the medical staff entering your
room without permission, restraining you on the bed, and injecting
you with a powerful antipsychotic medication by forcibly sticking a
needle into your body.
Despite the Kafkaesque nature of the above facts, this Recent
Development argues that forcible medication to restore competency
in the above circumstances is constitutional. In some limited
circumstances, even nonviolent offenders can-and should-be
forcibly medicated. Using the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in
United States v. White2 as an example, this Recent Development
© 2012 James A. Coulter.
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts in the recent Fourth Circuit opinion
United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 405-07 (4th Cir. 2010).
2. 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010).
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attempts to define the contours of when the Constitution permits
forcible medication of nonviolent offenders.
In White, a divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed a district
court's order to forcibly medicate a defendant charged with
nonviolent crimes.3 Underlying much of the majority's opinion was
the concern that "the district court's order ... [came] perilously close
to a forcible medication regime best described not as 'limited,' but as
'routine' . . . ." This is a slippery slope argument.5 The court was
concerned that the decision to forcibly medicate White would
eventually lead to a Fourth Circuit standard under which incompetent
criminal defendants are routinely subjected to forced medication, no
matter how minor the nature of the charges.6
3. Id. at 422. The three judge panel produced one majority opinion, a concurring
opinion, and a dissent. Id. at 404. Thus, each judge on the panel wrote separately. In
dissent, Judge Niemeyer wrote "this case presents the paradigmatic case that ... would
appropriately justify involuntary medication to enable a defendant to stand trial." Id. at
430-31 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 405 (majority opinion). The court bookends the opinion with this
justification, presenting it in the introductory paragraph of the opinion and restating it in
the conclusion, both times as a primary reason for its holding. See id. at 405, 422.
5. A "slippery slope" may be defined as "a particular act, seemingly innocuous when
taken in isolation, [which] may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly
pernicious events." Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361-62
(1985). Slippery slope arguments are frequently brought up in the context of First
Amendment freedom of speech cases. See id. at 363. For example, in Communist Party of
the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Justice Black famously wrote: "I
do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition
and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting). This is a classic slippery slope argument: the act of denying First
Amendment protection to the ideas of the Communist Party-arguably innocuous by
itself, at least to the majority-may lead to a future in which speech upholding democratic
ideas is denied First Amendment protection based on the same reasoning. For additional
opinions relying on slippery slope arguments, see, for example, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 417 (1989) ("To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to be
used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no
discernible or defensible boundaries. Could the government, on this theory, prohibit the
burning of state flags? Of copies of the Presidential seal? Of the Constitution?"); Bifulco
v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 401-02 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Particularly in
the administration of criminal justice, a badly drawn statute places strains on judges. The
temptation to exceed our limited judicial role and do what we regard as the more sensible
thing is great, but it takes us on a slippery slope." (internal citations omitted)); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 405 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) ("I cannot
join the implication in [Justice Powell's] opinion that some forms of legal advertising may
be constitutionally protected. The Valentine distinction was constitutionally sound and
practically workable, and I am still unwilling to take even one step down the 'slippery
slope' away from it.").
6. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1026, 1028-29 (2003).
2012] FORCIBLE MEDICATION
The United States Supreme Court sought to guard against this
precise result in Sell v. United States,7 the leading case on forced
medication to restore competency.8 The White court, concerned that
the district court did not properly apply the test set forth in Sell and
worried about a possible slippery slope leading to routine forcible
medication, created a more demanding iteration of the Sell test that
considers whether the crime was nonviolent when determining
whether a defendant can be forcibly medicated.9 However, there is a
significant problem with the White court's opinion. The court ignores
a possible slippery slope in the opposite direction: the White decision
could lead to a Fourth Circuit in which defendants charged with
nonviolent crimes are never forcibly medicated. °
This Recent Development, drawing on Eugene Volokh's The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope," explains how the White decision
starts down this reverse slippery slope. It also uses the White decision
to analyze whether defendants charged with nonviolent crimes who
do not present a public safety risk and who are presumed innocent
until proven guilty should ever be subject to forced medication. The
Recent Development ultimately agrees with the White dissent that the
defendant should have been forcibly medicated" and argues that the
7. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
8. For a discussion of the Sell factors, see infra Part I.B. Consistent with Sell, the
district court engaged in an extensive analysis of the Sell factors before ordering the
forcible medication of White. See White, 620 F.3d at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the district court conducted an "especially careful and thorough review" as it applied
the Sell factors).
9. See infra Part ll.B.
10. Admittedly, most nonviolent offenders should not be forcibly medicated. The
forcible medication process involves restraining the defendant and inserting a syringe into
the defendant's body. See, e.g., White, 620 F.3d at 407 ("After the force team secured
White's arms and legs in restraints, the treatment team would enter and collect labs (if
necessary), medicate White, [using intravenous medications,] and then evaluate her for
injuries."). Such a direct physical invasion of the defendant's bodily integrity violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, absent a showing of an
important governmental interest. See infra Part I.B. For minor, nonviolent offenses, the
government will not be able to justify forcible medication. However, there is an important
distinction between "most nonviolent offenses" (those that will not justify forcible
medication) and never forcibly medicating nonviolent offenders. This Recent
Development focuses on serious nonviolent offenses-such as identity theft-that may
cause immense financial, social, and economic harm. While these crimes are nonviolent,
they may be serious enough to justify forcible medication of incompetent defendants. The
government has an important interest in prosecuting defendants who have drained bank
accounts, ruined credit histories, or stolen a person's most treasured possessions. This
Recent Development argues that the White opinion may prevent forcible medication for
defendants charged with these serious (though nonviolent) crimes.
11. Volokh, supra note 6, at 1028.
12. White, 620 F.3d at 430-31 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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White decision may lead to the undesirable result that defendants
charged with nonviolent crimes in the Fourth Circuit will never
forcibly medicated to restore competency.
This Recent Development is organized in four parts. Part I
provides the factual and legal background of the White decision. This
part describes White's specific diagnosis, as well as the procedure the
psychiatric staff would have followed to forcibly medicate White. Part
I also explains the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States,
which provides a multi-factor test for determining whether the
Constitution permits involuntary medication to restore competency.13
Part II analyzes how the court applied the specific Sell factors in the
White case. It argues that the court misapplied the Sell factors and
relevant Fourth Circuit precedent, partly because White was charged
with a nonviolent crime. Part III explains how White represents what
Eugene Volokh calls an "attitude-altering slippery slope"14 in the
direction of never forcibly medicating nonviolent offenders. Finally,
the Recent Development concludes by arguing that White represents
a substantial departure from Fourth Circuit precedent and could lead
to a Fourth Circuit in which nonviolent defendants are never forcibly
medicated.
I. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF WHITE
A. Factual Background
In 2007, Kimberly White and a codefendant engaged in a credit
card fraud and identity theft scheme. 5 The defendants stole credit
cards from two victims and used the credit cards to purchase
numerous items at Costco, Home Depot, and Zales Jewelers in the
Raleigh, North Carolina area.6 White was subsequently charged with
six felonies: one count of conspiracy to commit credit card fraud,
three counts of credit card fraud, and two counts of aggravated
identity theft. 7 After her arrest, the public defender filed a motion to
determine competency, and the subsequent psychiatric evaluation
revealed White was not competent to stand trial. 8 White was then
transferred to a government psychiatric hospital for the purpose of
13. 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
14. Volokh, supra note 6, at 1077.
15. Indictment at 1-4, United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010) (No.
5:08CV81), 2008 WL 7312256, at *1-4.
16. Id.




determining whether competency could be restored. 9 This transfer
functioned as an involuntary psychiatric commitment because White
was transferred from the jail where she was awaiting trial to a
psychiatric facility against her will.20 However, White was not
dangerous to herself or others and, thus, did not meet criteria for civil
commitment.21
While at the psychiatric unit, the depth of White's mental illness
became apparent. From the beginning, White refused any medical
staff attempts at evaluation, and she refused to speak with anyone
who appeared to be in a position of authority.2 In her cell, White
mixed portions of her food together and claimed that she had
discovered the cure for AIDS and breast cancer.23 White also wrote
notes on the wall about her alleged cure for AIDS and her desire to
patent it.24 When writing utensils were removed, she wrote these
notes in her own blood.' White refused to leave her room or allow
staff into the room for fear staff would steal her cure. 26 The stench of
rotten food permeated the unit; only when staff threatened to forcibly
remove White from the room did White comply and allow them in at
19. Id.
20. See id. The district court had authority to order this type of psychiatric
commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006).
21. White, 620 F.3d at 407. It is important to distinguish civil commitment from
commitment to restore competency. Civil commitment is the process by which the state
determines whether an individual presents an imminent risk of harm to herself or others,
and places her in a psychiatric facility against her will. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-
261(a)-(b) (2009) (explaining the North Carolina procedure by which an individual may
be civilly committed if she is a danger to herself or others). The civil commitment process
is governed by state law. See id. In contrast, commitment for competency restoration
occurs when an individual has been charged with a crime, but suffers from a mental illness
that renders her incompetent to stand trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). As was the case with
Kimberly White, the defendant may present no danger to herself or others, yet still suffer
from severe mental illness that renders her incompetent to stand trial. White, 620 F.3d at
407. This Recent Development focuses on forced medication in the context of competency
restoration proceedings when the defendant is not a danger to herself or others. When
defendants in federal prison become dangerous, forced medication may be justified on
safety grounds, rather than on grounds of competency restoration. Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003) (explaining that forced medication of federal prisoners on
dangerousness grounds is constitutionally permissible (citing Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 225-26 (1990))).
22. White, 620 F.3d at 405-06.
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the last minute.27 Despite this behavior, the medical staff determined
that White did not present a danger to herself or others.28
Because White refused to interact meaningfully with any of the
medical staff, the treating clinicians diagnosed White based primarily
on information obtained from staff observation.29 Dr. Powers, the
treating psychologist, made the diagnosis. She relied on her own
observations of White and medical staff reports of White's behavior
on the unit.3" Although it is not completely clear from the opinion, it
appears Dr. Powers also collected past medical reports and
information from White's family before making the diagnosis.31 Dr.
Powers diagnosed White with Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type.32
To fully understand White's mental illness, a brief description of
Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type is necessary. Delusions are
false beliefs; the patient believes something about herself or the world
that is not true.33 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders defines Delusional Disorder as "[n]onbizarre delusions
(i.e., involving situations that occur in real life, such as being followed,
poisoned, infected, loved at a distance, or deceived by spouse or
lover, or having a disease) of at least 1 month's duration. ' 34 The
Grandiose Type of Delusional Disorder means the patient has
"delusions of inflated worth, power, knowledge, identity, or special
relationship to a deity or famous person."35
Medical staff attempted to persuade White to accept medication
that would treat her disorder and restore her competency to stand
27. Id.
28. Id. at 407 ("[The treating psychologist] reiterated that because White presents no
danger to herself or to others, forcible medication is not justified on such grounds."). The
court does not explain how the psychologist arrived at the determination that White was
not dangerous, a determination which seems questionable given the fact that White cut
herself so she could write notes on the wall in her own blood. See id. at 406. Presumably,
White did not threaten or physically assault any staff members, and the medical staff
determined that the cutting was not sufficiently serious to warrant a finding of
dangerousness to self.
29. Id. at 406-07.
30. Id. at 407.
31. Id. The court is dismissive of the opinions of both the psychologist and the
psychiatrist who evaluated White. See id. When the court discussed Dr. Powers'
evaluation, it put the term "examined" in quotation marks. Id. The court also emphasized
that Dr. Kempke, the psychiatrist, did not contact the family or obtain additional medical
records. See id.
32. Id.
33. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 323-29 (Michael B. First et al. eds., 4th ed. text rev. 2000).




trial. 6 However, White refused all medication, and the treating
medical staff ultimately concluded that forced medication was the
only way to restore her competency.37 The district court subsequently
held a Sell hearing, which is an evidentiary hearing where the court
determines if the government has met its burden to administer
forcible medication.38 The Sell hearing focused on White's diagnosis,
her behavior at the psychiatric unit, the medical staff's opinion that
forced medication was the only option to restore competency, the
medications that would be used for such restoration, and the
procedure by which White would be medicated.39
Involuntary medication is extremely intrusive. Hospital policy
required that staff first attempt to persuade White to take an
injectable antipsychotic drug voluntarily.' Assuming she refused,
staff would try to convince White to cooperate, ultimately forcibly
medicating her if she resisted.41 Five staff members would put on
protective equipment, enter the room, restrain White, and forcibly
inject her with the medication.4" This process was to be repeated
every two weeks, possibly for several months preceding the trial, and
then throughout the trial's duration.43
The Sell hearing was critical to the government's case against
White. Because White was incompetent to stand trial and did not
meet the statutory criteria for civil commitment, she would have been
set free without trial if the district court denied the forced medication
request.' The district court ultimately held that the government had
36. See White, 620 F.3d at 406.
37. Id. The medical staff also attempted non-medical interventions such as
competency restoration classes, but White refused to attend any of those classes. Id. at
407.
38. Id. at 406. See infra Part I.B for discussion of the precise factors the government
must meet. See infra Part II for how the Fourth Circuit applied the Sell factors in White.
39. See White, 620 F.3d at 406-09.
40. Id. at 407.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The medication Dr. Kempke proposed using was Risperdal Consta. Id. at 426.
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting). It carries some risk of side effects, including Tardive Dyskinesia
and Metabolic Syndrome. Id. at 407-08 (majority opinion). Tardive Dyskinesia is a
condition characterized by involuntary muscle contractions, which can be extremely
disturbing to patients, but not fatal. Id. Metabolic Syndrome can cause weight gain,
cardiovascular disease, and diabetes. Id. at 408. Both Tardive Dyskinesia and Metabolic
Syndrome are rare. Id.
44. See id. at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("[The White majority] concludes that the
government's interest in prosecuting White is so diminished that, as a matter of law, she
must now be set free, without facing a trial or the consequences of a conviction."); see also
id. at 407 (majority opinion) (explaining that White did not meet the statutory criteria for
involuntary commitment).
2012]
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carried its burden under the Sell test and ordered that White be
forcibly medicated. 45 However, anticipating an appeal from White,
the district court stayed the order.' White subsequently filed an
interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's order.47 The
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the government had not met its
burden under the Sell test 8.4 Although there is no reported decision
describing the ultimate outcome, presumably White was released
pursuant to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, since White did not meet
criteria for civil commitment and refused any medical intervention
aimed at restoring competency.49
B. Legal Background
Because forced medication constitutes a direct and unwanted
physical invasion of a person's bodily integrity, the government must
meet a heavy evidentiary burden to justify forced medication. The
Supreme Court articulated the government's burden in Sell v. United
States."
In Sell, the Supreme Court held that forced medication to restore
competency is constitutional, but only in limited circumstances.5 Sell
was a dentist who, similar to Kimberly White, suffered from
Delusional Disorder. 2 Prior to his arrest, Sell commented "that the
gold he used for [his patients'] fillings had been contaminated by
communists .... "1 He also called police claiming a leopard was
outside his office and asked the police to shoot it.54 Ultimately, he was
charged with insurance fraud and attempting to murder both the FBI
agent who arrested him and a former employee who intended to
testify against him in the fraud case.55 At a bail revocation hearing, he
spit in the magistrate judge's face and screamed personal and racial
insults.56 Sell was ultimately transferred to a federal psychiatric
facility, where doctors determined that antipsychotic medication
45. Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 405. The specific reasoning the court gives is discussed infra Part II.
49. See id. at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that White was to be set free if
the court reversed the forcible medication order).
50. 539 U.S. 166, 169, 179-82 (2003).
51. Id. at 179.
52. Id. at 169-71.
53. Id. at 169.
54. Id.




would be necessary to restore competency. 7 However, Sell refused to
voluntarily take any medication. 8 Thus, forced medication was the
only option to restore competency and prosecute Sell.
The Supreme Court vacated the Eight Circuit's order to forcibly
medicate Sell, and remanded the case for rehearing. 9 In doing so, the
Supreme Court made clear that defendants have a "constitutionally
protected liberty 'interest in avoiding involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs' ... ." Thus, the government must show an
''essential" or "overriding" state interest before forced medication is
constitutionally permissible.6 In an effort to clarify when the
government has met this burden, the Supreme Court delineated four
factors that must be present before a defendant can be involuntarily
medicated: (1) "important governmental interests are at stake" and
special circumstances do not mitigate the importance of the interest;
(2) "involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests [because] administration of the drugs is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial
[and] substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere
significantly with defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a
trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair"; (3) "involuntary
medication is necessary to further those interests [because]
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve
substantially the same results"; and (4) "administration of the drugs is
medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in
light of his medical condition."62
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 186.
60. See id. at 178 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)).
61. See id. at 178-79 (internal citation omitted); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135
(1992) ("[F]orcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a
finding of overriding justification.... The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as
much protection to persons the State detains for trial. .. . Nevada certainly would have
satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had
found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the
safety of others. Similarly, the State might have been able to justify medically appropriate,
involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an
adjudication of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means." (internal
citations omitted)).
62. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. Because criminal defendants have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in avoiding forced medication, the four factor test is intended to
create a heavy burden on the government. Id. at 178-79. The court must find that each
factor is independently established, and no factor weighs more heavily than any other
factor. See id. at 180-81 (explaining that each factor must be independently established
before a court can order forced medication to restore competency). Of course, the facts of
2012]
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The White court held that the government had not carried its
burden as to the first factor, and did not discuss the second, third, or
fourth factors.63 As such, this Recent Development only addresses the
first factor of the Sell analysis. In Sell, the Court explained that the
government has an important interest in prosecuting defendants
accused of "serious" crimes because the government's interest in
protecting society from serious crimes outweighs the defendant's
liberty interest.' The Court stated:
The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual
accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the
offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime
against property. In both instances the Government seeks to
protect through application of the criminal law the basic human
need for security.
65
Thus, serious crimes can be crimes against property or crimes against
persons.66 However, the Court never explicitly defined what
constitutes a "serious crime," leaving that question open for the lower
courts to resolve.67
The Sell Court went on to explain that "[s]pecial circumstances
may lessen the importance of [the government's] interest."68 Thus,
even if the government has made the requisite showing of a "serious
crime"-however that term is defined in a particular jurisdiction-a
court can still refuse to hold that this factor is satisfied because a
"special circumstance" is present.69 To assist lower courts, the Court
provided two examples of special circumstances: (1) the possibility for
a lengthy civil commitment in a psychiatric institution and (2) "the
a particular case may necessitate more detailed analysis of a given factor, especially where
that factor is outcome determinative. See, e.g., United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410-
22 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing extensive discussion of the first factor because that factor was
outcome determinative). For a more detailed discussion of the Sell factors, see generally
Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1121-33
(2008).
63. See White, 620 F.3d at 410-20.
64. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
65. Id. (internal citation omitted).
66. See id. For this reason, nonviolent crimes can be serious crimes for purposes of
factor one. Thus, the Fourth Circuit cannot develop a per se rule that defendants charged
with nonviolent crimes can never be forcibly medicated. However, this Recent
Development argues that the White decision begins a slippery slope process whereby
courts in the Fourth Circuit, forced to follow White, will eventually reach a point in which
nonviolent defendants can never be forcibly medicated. See infra Part III.





possibility that the defendant has already been, confined for a
significant amount of time" awaiting trial and/or competency
determination.7" The Sell Court's use of the phrase "for example,"
and its instruction for lower courts to "consider the facts of the
individual case in evaluating the Government's interest" when
describing the special circumstances, indicate that this list is non-
exclusive.7  When lower courts examine whether special
circumstances diminish the importance of the government's interest,
they are free therefore to consider additional special circumstances
beyond the two described in Sell.72 In theory, where such discretion is
given to the lower courts, one would expect wide variability in the
number and type of special circumstances analyzed under factor one.
In practice, however, most courts have focused on the two special
circumstances listed in Sell, or ignored the special circumstance
analysis altogether. That is, at least, until the White decision was
handed down.74
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the Sell factors in two recent
decisions.75 In United States v. Evans,76 the defendant was charged
70. See id.
71. See id. ("Courts, however, must consider the facts of the individual case in
evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution. Special circumstances may lessen the
importance of that interest. The defendant's failure to take drugs voluntarily, for example,
may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill . (emphasis
added)).
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839-40 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding the
defendant was charged with a serious crime but providing no discussion of how special
circumstances could mitigate the importance of the government's interest); United States
v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 917-19 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing instructions for the
district court in applying the important government interest factor with mention only of
the two special circumstances listed in Sell that may lessen the government's interest);
United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the important
government interest test with no mention of special circumstances); United States v.
Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2004) (addressing only the special circumstance of
civil commitment). Thus, prior to White, most federal courts either ignored the special
circumstances analysis altogether or focused only on the special circumstances listed in the
Sell opinion itself. White may have a positive effect in this regard, reminding courts that
the special circumstance analysis is an important part of the Sell factor one analysis and
ensuring that the government meets a high evidentiary burden before obtaining an order
for forcible medication. In a recent Eighth Circuit case, the court, citing White, conducted
a more extensive special circumstance analysis. See United States v. Nicklas, 623 F.3d
1175, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 2010) (focusing on the possibility of civil commitment, protection
of the public from future harm, the length of confinement, and the nature of the offense
(violent or nonviolent) in conducting the special circumstances analysis, while "[a]ssuming,
without deciding," that the nature of the offense is a legitimate special circumstance).
74. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 411-21 (4th Cir. 2010).
75. See United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 813-18 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 235-42 (4th Cir. 2005).
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with threatening to kill a federal judge, an offense punishable by up
to ten years in prison." The Evans court's analysis of the first Sell
factor is particularly relevant for purposes of analyzing the White
decision.78 Recall that the first factor in the Sell analysis is whether
there is an important government interest in prosecuting the
defendant, which can be satisfied if the defendant is charged with a
"serious crime."79 The Evans court provided a general guideline for
defining the term "serious crime." Although the court declined to
"set forth any rigid rule as to what the statutory maximum must be for
a crime to be a serious one[,]" it explained that the crime at issue,
with a statutory maximum penalty in excess of ten years, was "
'serious' under any reasonable standard."8 The court specifically
refused to use the sentencing guidelines for purposes of determining
the length of the likely sentence. It did so because the sentencing
guidelines require findings of fact by the trial court based on a
detailed investigation of the defendant and testimony offered at trial
or in a plea; the Sell hearing typically occurs before these findings of
fact are made.81
76. 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005).
77. Id. at 238. Evans was also charged with assaulting an agricultural officer, but the
court focused on the threatening of a federal judge because the maximum penalty is much
greater. See id.
78. The Evans court ultimately held that the government had made an insufficient
showing on the second and fourth factors of the Sell analysis, but it allowed the
government, on remand, to present further evidence on the second and fourth factors. See
id. at 240-43. Because the medical report did not identify the specific antipsychotic
medication that would be used to restore competency, the Evans court found that the
district court "clearly erred" in finding that use of "antipsychotic medication," described
only generally, was medically appropriate. Id. at 240. The court required that the medical
report identify the specific medication, and detail how that medication was specifically
"medically appropriate" (i.e., medically safe) for Evans to satisfy factor four. Id. at 240-42.
Similarly, the court held that factor two was not satisfied by the government's conclusive
statement that antipsychotic medication was the "primary" class of drugs for treating
Evans' disorder and was therefore " 'substantially likely' to restore Evans'
competency...." Id. at 241. The court required that the government show how the
specific drug would restore competency for Evans, given his specific medical history. Id.
The court remanded on the second and fourth factors, with specific instructions for how
the government could improve the reports to satisfy those factors. Id. at 240-43. Despite
the fact that the court remanded on the second and fourth factors, the court analyzed the
first factor and determined that the government had an important interest in prosecuting
Evans and that this interest was not diminished by any special circumstances. Id. at 236-
40.
79. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
80. Evans, 404 F.3d at 238. In addition, the court declined to create a bright line rule
for crimes that carry statutory maximum penalties of less than ten years. See id.
81. See id. As discussed infra Part ILA, the White court disregards this aspect of
Evans.
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.The Evans court then turned to the possible special
circumstances that could lessen the seriousness of the crime. The
court considered the two special circumstances listed in Sell: (1) the
possibility for a lengthy civil commitment in a psychiatric institution,
and (2) the possibility that the defendant has already "been confined
for a significant amount of time" awaiting trial and/or competency
determination.' The Evans court did not consider any additional
special circumstances despite the fact that the Sell Court's list was
non-exclusive. 83 In considering whether Evans had already served a
significant amount of time, the Evans court compared the amount of
time Evans had already served to the maximum possible statutory
sentence and concluded the government still had an important
interest in prosecuting someone facing eight years in prison (Evans
had served two years).8' Evans therefore appears to hold that the time
already served can only diminish the government's interest if the time
served reduced the maximum possible sentence significantly.85 As to
the possibility of a lengthy civil commitment, the court rejected this
special circumstance as well because there was no evidence suggesting
Evans would be civilly committed; similar to Kimberly White, Evans
was to be set free without any determination of guilt if the court did
not order involuntary medication.86
In United States v. Bush,87 the Fourth Circuit also addressed the
first factor of the Sell analysis.88 Similar to Evans, Bush involved a
mentally ill defendant who had threatened to kill federal judges.89
Like White, Bush suffered from Delusional Disorder.9" Bush's
delusions centered on federal judges, whom she believed were
withholding from her, among other things, medical services, money,
82. Id. at 239 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180).
83. See id. at 239-40.
84. See id. at 239. The White court takes a wholly different approach to analyzing this
special circumstance. See infra Part II.
85. The court again refused to provide a bright line test for how much the maximum
statutory sentence must be reduced for this special circumstance to diminish the
government's interest. The most that can be said is that a two-year reduction of a ten-year
maximum sentence is not sufficient. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 238-40. Additionally, even if
the time served does reduce the maximum sentence by a substantial margin, the court
specifically noted that additional purposes for criminal punishment might still justify a
finding that the government has important interests in prosecuting the crime. See id. at 239
n.9.
86. See id. at 239.
87. 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009).
88. Id. at 814-15.
89. See id. at 810-11.
90. See id. at 809 (stating that Bush suffered from Delusional Disorder, Persecutory
Type).
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and housing opportunities.91 As a result of these delusions, Bush filed
more than 100 lawsuits between 1995 and 2009.92 In the course of
several of these lawsuits, Bush came to believe that the judges hearing
her cases were abusing and assaulting her by dismissing the suits, and
in the litigation underlying Bush, she made threatening statements
toward several judges.93 The FBI became involved and warned Bush
not to send threatening letters to judges.94 However, when Bush later
lost the lawsuit, she wrote another threatening letter to the judge
assigned to the case.95 The authorities were not impressed with Bush's
attempt to conceal the threat by writing "NO THREAT" in capital
letters at the top of the page, and she was charged with two counts of
threatening a federal judge. 96
In evaluating the case, the Bush court first reaffirmed the Evans
court in finding that, when the defendant's maximum statutory
sentence is at least ten years, the defendant has been charged with a
serious crime, and the government has an important interest in
prosecuting the crime.97 The Bush court next turned to the special
circumstances analysis. Similar to Evans, the Bush court focused on
the special circumstances in the Sell decision, rather than creating an
extensive list of new special circumstances to consider.98 The court
analyzed the amount of time Bush had already served because that
was the only special circumstance applicable to her case. 99 The court
recognized that Bush had spent so much time in prison that any
prison sentence would be covered, or nearly covered, by time already
served. 100 Despite the presence of this special circumstance, the court
held that the government had met its burden on the first factor.'0 '
The court explained that even if a defendant has served most of
the maximum time she would receive if convicted, the government
can still show an important interest based on the message a conviction
91. See id.
92. See id. at 809-10 (stating that Bush, "by her own account," had filed this number
of lawsuits).
93. See id. at 810-11.
94. Id. at 810.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 810-11.
97. See id. at 814 (internal citation omitted).
98. See id. at 815. The Bush court did, however, appear to consider whether Bush
presented a threat to public safety, but it did not significantly elaborate on this point. See
id. (explaining that a conviction would limit Bush's ability to own firearms and would






conveys to society, the fact that a defendant may be supervised post-
conviction (such as through probation or parole), and the fact that a
conviction would limit the defendant's ability to own firearms.12
Thus, at least prior to the White decision, the government could show
an important interest if the maximum statutory penalty exceeded ten
years, and it could defeat the claim that such interest was diminished
by time already served by arguing that the conviction implicates other
government interests beyond punishing the offender."3
The White court disregarded the Bush reasoning on the first
factor and imposed a new, stricter burden the government must meet
before satisfying the first factor."° As the next part argues, the burden
imposed is a substantial departure from both the Bush and Evans
precedents, and it may result in a Fourth Circuit standard under
which the forcible medication of nonviolent offenders is never
constitutionally permissible.
II. THE SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURE FROM EVANS AND B USH IN
UNITED STATES V. WHITE
As mentioned above, the White court held that the government
made an insufficient showing on the first factor of the Sell analysis
and reversed the district court's order to forcibly medicate White.05
After explaining that White had been charged with a serious crime,
the court examined White's likely period of confinement relative to
her projected sentence (one of the special circumstances listed in
Sell)." However, by calculating White's likely future confinement-
using a speculative analysis of how long White could be confined
through trial and the appellate process-rather than focusing on the
amount of time already served, the court's analysis of this special
circumstance departed significantly from the Bush and Evans
102. See id.
103. See id. at 814-15.
104. White was decided a mere eleven months after the Bush decision, which further
supports the idea that White was a response to the expansive reading of the first Sell factor
in Bush. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 401 (4th Cir. 2010); Bush, 585 F.3d at 806.
Also note that Judge Niemeyer, the author of the dissent in White, wrote the opinion in
Bush. White, 620 F.3d at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); Bush, 585 F.3d at 806.
105. See White, 620 F.3d at 405, 410. This holding means White, charged with six
felonies, is going to be set free without any trial. See id. at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting);
supra text accompanying notes 44-49. The medical staff determined that White did not
meet criteria for civil commitment. See White, 620 F.3d at 419 (majority opinion).
Therefore, since the court found that forcible medication to restore competency was
unconstitutional under Sell, id. at 422, the charges will be dropped and White will be set
free.
106. See White, 620 F.3d at 410, 413-19.
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precedent. °7 The court went on to create a new list of special
circumstances applicable to White, none of which is present in either
Bush or Evans."°8 These new special circumstances included: the
nature of the crime (i.e., violent vs. nonviolent), the unique medical
condition that White suffered from, and whether the case was
"sufficiently exceptional" to justify forced medication."° Thus, unlike
Bush and Evans, the White court went far beyond the two special
circumstances listed in the Sell opinion that can mitigate the
government's important interest."0
The court's special circumstance analysis is troubling, and it
provides little guidance to district courts and magistrate judges that
must implement the holding. First, the White court engaged in a
highly complex, confusing calculation of the defendant's likely time
served and likely sentence-a calculation that is wholly inconsistent
with both Bush and Evans. Second, the court considered the
nonviolent nature of White's offenses as a special circumstance
mitigating the government's interest in prosecuting White, a process
inconsistent with Sell itself.
A. The Time White Had Already Served Versus Her Likely Sentence
Recall that to satisfy the first factor of the Sell analysis, the
government must show that an "important governmental interest[]" is
at stake in prosecuting the defendant and that the government can
meet this burden by showing the defendant is charged with a serious
crime."' Pursuant to Bush and Evans, the White court first found that
White was charged with serious crimes because the statutory
maximum sentence for the crimes charged exceeded ten years." 2
Thus, because White was charged with serious crimes, the first factor
of the Sell analysis was satisfied unless special circumstances
"lessen[ed] the importance of" the government's interest.113 The
107. See id. at 413-19.
108. See id. at 413; Bush, 585 F.3d at 814-15; United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 239-
40 (4th Cir. 2005).
109. See White, 620 F.3d at 413.
110. See id. at 412. As discussed earlier, the White court correctly notes that the list of
special circumstances in Sell is non-exclusive. Id. (citing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
180 (2003)).
111. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). For a more detailed discussion of
the Sell factors and the term "serious crime," see supra Part I.B.
112. See White, 620 F.3d at 410-11.
113. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
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initial special circumstance the court focused on was the amount of
time of White's confinement, relative to her likely sentence."'
In contradiction to both Bush and Evans, and ignoring the plain
meaning of Sell, the White court engaged in a highly complex and
speculative analysis of White's length of confinement.115 Instead of
simply counting the amount of time served from arrest to the Sell
hearing, as the Bush and Evans courts did, the White court calculated
the amount of time White would likely serve throughout the trial and
appellate process-and then added this figure to the time already
served." 6 Although Bush and Evans did not explicitly give reasons for
using the time served until the hearings rather than the time the
defendants would likely serve through trial, one can assume that the
calculation of this latter number would be fraught with speculation.
Jury trials can last anywhere from several days to several months.
There is no guarantee, as the White majority appears to assume, that
White would have appealed had she lost.117 The court came up with a
highly speculative figure of fifty-seven months for White's length of
confinement despite the fact that White had only actually served
approximately forty-one months at the time of the Sell hearing.118
The White court engaged in an even more complicated and
speculative calculation of White's likely sentence, which was also
inconsistent with Bush and Evans.119 To determine her likely
sentence, the court analyzed the sentencing guidelines for the
offenses White was charged with, the amount of time her codefendant
received for similar charges, and the average length of prison
sentences for defendants charged with the same crimes as White
114. See White, 620 F.3d at 413-19.
115. See id. at 414-18.
116. See id.; United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 239 (4th Cir. 2005). The Bush court also explained that even if a
defendant had served most of his likely sentence, other factors associated with a
conviction, such as the message a conviction conveys to society and the fact that the
defendant may be supervised post-conviction, could justify forcible medication. Bush, 585
F.3d at 815. The White court likely wanted to limit this expansive application of the Sell
test because the Bush reasoning makes it relatively easy to conclude the state has an
important governmental interest in forcible medication. See supra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text.
117. See White, 620 F.3d at 414 n.11. The court cites the fact that the public defender
assigned to White "vigorously pursued" the appeal to the Fourth Circuit as evidence that
the attorney will continue this "vigorous representation." Id. However, absent some
statement from the attorney guaranteeing appeal, adding additional months to the length
of time White has already been confined based on the possibility of appeal is questionable.
118. See id. at 414-15.
119. See id. at 415; see also id. at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority's
findings to support these conclusions bubble with speculation of the grandest type.").
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based on data from the United States Sentencing Commission)20 The
use of the sentencing guidelines is consistent with Bush.12' However,
in Bush, the court was able to accurately apply the sentencing
guidelines because the guidelines themselves, "the government's
concessions, and the district court's observations indicate[d] that if
Bush were found guilty, she would likely be sentenced to only time
served."'22 As the dissent in White pointed out, the court did not have
similar information to guide its calculation with respect to White. 3
Additionally, unlike the White court, neither Bush nor Evans used
data from the Sentencing Commission or the sentence of a
codefendant." 4 The government in White therefore did not know it
needed to examine or use this data when addressing the first factor at
the Sell hearing.
For all of the above reasons, in examining the first special
circumstance-comparison of the time already confined relative to
the likely sentence-the White court departed significantly from both
Bush and Evans. To justify this departure, the White court
distinguished Bush and Evans primarily on the nonviolent nature of
the offenses charged. 25 The White court stated:
Both [Bush and Evans], involving a defendant who had
allegedly threatened the life of a federal judge (and in Evans,
one who had also allegedly assaulted a federal employee),
provide guidance to us here but do not control the outcome of
our fact-intensive inquiry into the special circumstances of this
case.
126
It appears, then, that this searching and speculative calculation of
White's likely sentence may have been motivated by the fact that her
crimes were nonviolent. As the next section argues, the disparate
treatment of nonviolent and violent crimes is not only inconsistent
with Sell itself, but also ignores the real problem: nonviolent crimes,
in some circumstances, can cause as much societal harm as violent
crimes. The violent/nonviolent distinction has no place in the
120. See id. at 415-18 (majority opinion).
121. See Bush, 585 F.3d at 814.
122. Id. at 814.
123. White, 620 F.3d at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 416-18 (majority opinion); Bush, 585 F.3d at 814-15; United States v.
Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 239-40 (4th Cir. 2005).
125. White, 620 F.3d at 419 ("Not every crime is equally serious. The nature of White's
crimes lessens the government's interest in prosecuting her because her alleged crimes
were non-violent offenses.... The non-violent nature of White's crimes principally
distinguishes this case from Bush and Evans.").
126. Id. at 411.
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determination of whether a defendant should be forcibly medicated
to restore competency.
B. The White Court's Reluctance to Medicate a Nonviolent Offender
The White court's focus on the nonviolent nature of the charged
offenses is inconsistent with the Sell Court's explanation of the first
factor, as the Sell Court explicitly stated that the government can
have an important interest in prosecuting nonviolent offenders. 127 The
distinction between nonviolent and violent crimes is irrelevant to
determining whether the crime is serious under the first factor.
128
Despite this clear Supreme Court principle, the White court
nevertheless held that the nature of the offense can be a special
circumstance that diminishes the importance of the government's
interest in prosecuting a serious crime. 129 The court creates this special
circumstance without citation to any case law suggesting nonviolence
should be a special circumstance in the Sell analysis. The court simply
stated: "The nature of White's crimes lessens the government's
interest in prosecuting her because her alleged crimes were non-
violent offenses. Assuming her guilt, White's crimes did not physically
harm any individuals."'3 ° While the court correctly noted that the Sell
list of special circumstances is non-exclusive,"' it seems unlikely that
the nature of the offense is a legitimate special circumstance when the
Supreme Court specifically refused to apply this distinction to the
''serious crime" element of the first factor.
Additionally, the line between violent and nonviolent crimes is
not always clear.132 While Kimberly White's crimes were clearly
crimes only against property because they caused no personal
physical harm,133 district courts applying White may have a more
difficult time categorizing other types of crimes. As Eugene Volokh
wrote, "how does one classify drug crimes, which don't inherently
involve any outright violence, but do involve the risk of physical
127. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
128. Id. See supra Part I.B for a more detailed discussion of the first factor.
129. See White, 620 F.3d at 419 (holding, in the context of the special circumstances
analysis, that "[t]he nature of White's crimes lessens the government's interest in
prosecuting her because her alleged crimes were non-violent offenses").
130. Id.
131. See id. at 412-13.
132. See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1957, 1969-70 (2004) (noting the difficulty in determining whether drug-related
crimes are violent or nonviolent).
133. Note, however, a rare exception could occur in a case in which a person may be so
emotionally distraught from having his identity stolen that he becomes physically ill.
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injury or even death to the drug users or to others? How does one
classify residential burglary, which involves some risk of violence
9 . . ?,3 One can think of any number of similar contexts. What about
extortion or communicating threats? These crimes pose the risk of
violence, but offenders may never physically harm the victims.13
This is not only a theoretical problem. In Harmelin v.
Michigan,'36 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
life sentence for possessing 672 grams of cocaine. 3 7 The question of
whether drug crimes constituted violent crimes divided the Court. In
concurrence, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[the] suggestion that his crime
was nonviolent and victimless, echoed by the dissent, is false to the
point of absurdity. To the contrary, petitioner's crime threatened to
cause grave harm to society." '138 In dissent, Justice White, joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, distinguished the possession of drugs
from the "tangential effects" of drug use or drug dealing when
considering the seriousness of the offense:
It is one thing to uphold a checkpoint designed to detect drivers
then under the influence of a drug that creates a present risk
that they will harm others. It is quite something else to uphold
petitioner's sentence because of the collateral consequences
which might issue, however indirectly, from the drugs he
possessed.'39
Thus, for some crimes, courts will have to gauge the connection
between a particular crime and the possible violent consequences of
that crime when determining whether the crime is violent or
nonviolent. Since White held that the nonviolent nature of the offense
can be a special circumstance that mitigates the government's interest
in prosecution, district courts in the Fourth Circuit must now deal
with analyzing such a connection in determining whether a given
offense is nonviolent.
Additionally, the White court partly justified its holding that
nonviolence should be a special circumstance lessening the
134. Volokh, supra note 132, at 1969-70.
135. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.4 (2009) (defining extortion as "threaten[ing]
or communicat[ing] a threat or threats to another with the intention thereby wrongfully to
obtain anything of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity is guilty of
extortion"); § 14-277.1(a) (defining communicating threats, in relevant part, as "willfully
threaten[ing] to physically injure the person or that person's child, sibling, spouse, or
dependent or willfully threaten[ing] to damage the property of another").
136. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
137. See id. at 961-62.
138. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. Id. at 1023 (White, J., dissenting).
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government's interest on the basis that there was a need to protect
federal judges from future harm in Bush and Evans, whereas in White
no victims needed protection."4 This analysis ignores the fact that a
civil commitment (which can be ordered by the district court) could
have provided protection for the federal judges in both Evans and
Bush if the court found the defendants presented an imminent risk of
harm to the judges."' More importantly, the focus of the Sell hearing
is whether the defendant should be forcibly medicated to stand trial
for previously committed crimes, not whether the defendant presents
some risk of future harm. 42 The safety concern should be addressed
through the civil commitment process, not through the process
whereby the court decides to forcibly medicate a defendant to restore
competency.
While it is true that White's crimes did not physically harm any
person, property crimes can cause immense emotional and economic
harm.'43 As the dissent points out, the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme
likely caused significantly more human suffering than most simple
assaults.'" As the next part argues, the White decision can potentially
lead to a Fourth Circuit standard in which courts cannot order forced
medication to restore competency for defendants charged with even
the most atrocious nonviolent property crimes, simply because their
crimes are nonviolent.
140. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 419 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing that
"White's crimes did not physically harm any individuals").
141. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 239 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
Evans could have been civilly committed but that he did not currently meet the statutory
criteria, thus implying that the court did not think Evans presented an imminent risk to the
judge he threatened). The White majority also appears to fear the ultimate result in Evans,
in which the court ordered forcible medication, and the defendant was eventually found
not guilty by a jury of his peers. See White, 620 F.3d at 418 (stating that the White court
was troubled by the necessity of basing its analysis on the presumption White was guilty-
an assumption deemed "particularly unsettling in light of [Evans], where we permitted the
forcible medication of Evans, a schizophrenic, for the purpose of standing trial," only to
have separate juries find him not guilty). Of course, the possibility that the defendant may
be found innocent should not affect the decision whether he should be forcibly medicated.
The government has an important interest in prosecuting people for serious crimes
whether or not they ultimately are found to be guilty. See United States v. Sell, 539 U.S.
166, 180 (2003).
142. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 169; Evans, 404 F.3d at 235.
143. See White, 620 F.3d at 430 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("A given crime against
property, however, can be serious or even more serious than a given crime against the
person. Enormous harm and distress can be caused by fraud and Ponzi schemes, as can be
witnessed on a grand scale in the case of Bernard Madoff in New York.").
144. See id. For a discussion of the suffering Madoff's Ponzi scheme caused, see Leslie
Wayne, Madoffs Victims Speak in Court Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at B2.
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III. WHITE AS A SLIPPERY SLOPE
One of the central concerns for the White court was that forcibly
medicating White would create a slippery slope 14 in which the
forcible medication of incompetent defendants would become
"routine" in the Fourth Circuit."4 At both the beginning and the end
of the opinion, the White court expressed its concern that allowing the
forcible medication of White would relax the application of the Sell
test in the Fourth Circuit, setting a precedent whereby incompetent
defendants charged with serious crimes would be routinely forcibly
medicated. 47 This is a slippery slope argument. The court was
concerned that the initial decision to forcibly medicate White will
lead to the routine involuntary medication of incompetent
defendants, in contradiction to Sell.148 However, the court overlooks a
central problem with this reasoning: the decision creates a slippery
slope in the opposite direction. The reasoning in White could lead to a
Fourth Circuit standard under which nonviolent offenders charged
with serious crimes will rarely-if ever-be forcibly medicated.
This reverse slippery slope is an example of what Eugene
Volokh, in his Article The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, refers to
as an "attitude-altering slippery slope.' ' 149 An attitude-altering
slippery slope occurs where an initial judicial or legislative rule
desensitizes rulemakers and the public to a certain state of affairs,
making it easier to adopt a related, but more undesirable legal
standard in the future. 150 For example, defenders of the White
decision could argue the Sell analysis is intended to be a highly
factual, rigorous analysis in which defendants are forcibly medicated
in only limited circumstances.' Under that argument, the White court
145. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 361-62 (defining the term "slippery slope").
146. See White, 620 F.3d at 405,422.
147. See id. at 422. ("We decline to start down a path that would essentially permit the
government to forcibly medicate any and every defendant deemed incompetent to stand
trial, no matter how little public good or benefit will be achieved in doing so.").
148. See id. at 405, 422; see also Schauer, supra note 5, at 361-62 (defining the term
"slippery slope").
149. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 1077, 1081.
150. See id. at 1077-1105.
151. The White court would agree with this argument. See White, 620 F.3d at 411
(stating that Bush and Evans "provide guidance ... but do not control the outcome of our
fact-intensive inquiry into the special circumstances of this case"). Defenders of White may
include defense attorneys and public defenders who have a much better chance of
preventing the forced medication of their clients under White than they did under Bush or
Evans. Civil rights and mental health activists would also likely support White and the




justifiably conducted a highly factual analysis. However, lower courts
only have to adopt the general procedure of the analysis, not the
specific "special circumstances" of it or the lengthy, complicated
determination of White's likely sentence.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the mechanism
by which an attitude-altering slippery slope operates. The Fourth
Circuit obviously considered the nature of the offense when it
reversed the district court's order to forcibly medicate White. This
slight change in application of the Sell factors creates a state of affairs
in which judges are permitted to consider the nature of the offense
when making decisions about forced medication. Standing alone, this
seems like an innocuous-maybe even desirable-position. However,
through the mechanism of an attitude-altering slippery slope, this
slight change in the Sell analysis could lead to the undesirable result
that nonviolent offenders are never subject to forced medication in
the Fourth Circuit. As judges implement the White standard, their
attitudes regarding the use of the nonviolent nature of the offense as
a special circumstance will likely change. Judges will likely become
more amenable to using the nonviolent nature of the offense in the
first factor analysis because the White decision allows for (and
requires, in the case of district courts in the Fourth Circuit) this
precise result. Then, as a result of the "is-ought heuristic" described
below, judges may use the nonviolent nature of the offense as the
primary justification for refusing to forcibly medicate nonviolent
offenders-to the exclusion of the other important Sell special
circumstances. Eventually, nonviolent offenders would never be
forcibly medicated in the Fourth Circuit because the courts would use
the nonviolent nature of the offense as the primary special
circumstance mitigating the government's important interest. This is
how an "attitude-altering slippery slope' 152 operates.
The "is-ought heuristic" is an important concept underlying the
theory of attitude-altering slippery slopes,153 and it provides a possible
explanation for why judges may make the psychological shift from
treating the nonviolent nature of the offense as simply one additional
special circumstance to using it as the primary special circumstance in
mitigating the government's important interest. The "is-ought
heuristic" describes one way in which lawyers, judges, and the public
use the legal system to inform their judgments about the world.'54 The
152. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 1077.
153. See id. at 1080.
154. See id. at 1079-82 (analyzing the application of the "is-ought heuristic").
2012]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
process works as follows: Suppose a person will admit that he does
not know the answer to some particular question and does not have
time to develop expertise on his own (this is the current state of
affairs, the "is"); however, since .Congress or the courts have
addressed the question and answered it in a certain way, the person
will trust that Congress or the courts are correct because either
lawmakers or judges likely researched the area prior to making the
decision (this is how the person imagines the law "ought" to be).'55
Magistrate or district court judges in the Fourth Circuit may fall into
this cognitive error when interpreting White. Courts may assume that
the White court faithfully applied precedent. The judges may then
assume that nonviolence should be a central factor in determining
whether a defendant should be forcibly medicated (in contradiction
to Sell, Bush, and Evans). The underlying principle justifying the
decision in White becomes more persuasive and entrenched just by
virtue of the fact that White was decided at all.156
The process is further entrenched by the tendency people have to
simplify complex multi-factor tests into one single justification, to the
exclusion of more complicated or limiting parts of such tests. 157 This
process could easily occur as busy district court and magistrate judges
interpret White. The complex calculation of a defendant's likely
sentence may easily be overlooked in favor of the much easier
determination that the nonviolent nature of the offense justifies the
refusal to order forced medication. Through this process, the
nonviolent nature of the offense could become one of the most
significant factors judges look to when deciding these cases. Of
course, judges are required to faithfully apply all the factors of any
given test, based on the prior case law. The problem with the White
decision is that the complexity occurs within one specific factor that
allows for wide judicial discretion in creating additional special
circumstances. Within that factor, it may be easier to focus on a
single, simpler justification.
CONCLUSION
This Recent Development has argued that the White decision
represents a problematic case for the future of involuntary
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1081 ("The is-ought heuristic leads people to support B still further,
because the very enactment of A makes its underlying moral or pragmatic principle ...
more persuasive.").
157. Id. at 1091 (noting that it is "easy for people's simplified mental image.., to stress
only a subset of the factors").
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medication of nonviolent offenders. White was a substantial departure
from both the Bush and Evans precedents in the Fourth Circuit. By
engaging in the highly speculative, complicated analysis of White's
length of confinement and her likely sentence, the court showed that
any forced medication order that comes before it will be subject to
very strict review. The White court also improperly focused on the
nonviolent nature of the offense. The court added the nature of the
offense to the list of possible special circumstances that can mitigate
the government's interest, in contradiction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Sell.
If the White decision becomes the guide for all review of
involuntary medication orders in the Fourth Circuit, the district
courts will likely become especially suspicious of ordering forced
medication of nonviolent offenders. This slippery slope could lead to
a Fourth Circuit in which nonviolent offenders are never forcibly
medicated, regardless how egregious their crimes. In Sell, the
Supreme Court specifically rejected this approach. 58 Unfortunately,
the Fourth Circuit may have started down a path that could
ultimately lead to that exact state of affairs.
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